The thesis that there are parallels between physics and mysticism (‘parallelism’) has become a strong counterpoint to the counterculture critique of science, and to anti-science and anti-religion sentiments and movements.  Parallelism is an important intellectual current at the interface of science and religion, theology, and mysticism.  The nature of parallelism is, however, unclear.  Parallelists have not reflected critically on the nature and origins of their claims.  At the same time, students of science and society have not been attracted to the study of parallelism.  One reason for this, perhaps, is that until recently parallelism has been (1) peripheral to the mainstream history of ideas, nourished to a great extent in the literature of the occult- and pseudo-sciences, and (2) characterized by extravagant claims, such as Sung’s thesis that the central ideas of modern science are presaged in the I Ching, and Beau’s argument that Einstein’s theories were anticipated by one of the Yellow Emperor’s advisors forty-five hundred years ago. ¹  This situation is changing, and parallelist arguments are increasingly

being presented and debated in scholarly as well as popular forums. ²  The synthesis of mysticism and science is also the guiding idea behind the recent founding of educational-spiritual communities such as the Lindisfarne Association. ³  Parallelism has been strengthened by the observations of eminent scientists on complementarity and convergence between science and religion in general, and between physics and mysticism in particular. ⁴

This paper focuses on physics-mysticism parallelism.  One reason for this focus is that physics-mysticism parallelism juxtaposes the paradigmatic science and the paradigmatic spiritual experience, commonly supposed to be opposing modes of consciousness and knowing.  Within physics, elementary particle theory has received the special attention of parallelists.  This reflects the manner in which this field is characterized by some distinguished physicists. Jean-Pierre Vigier, for example, describes elementary particle theory as the most modern theory in high-energy physics, among the most advanced of all physical theories, and the theory most relevant to the experimental validation of our assumptions about the deep nature of matter. ⁵  This view, coupled with speculations by physicists such as Wigner on the relevance of consciousness to descriptions and interpretations of atomic phenomena, could help to explain why physicists have been drawn to explorations of states of

consciousness - including mysticism - and why, simultaneously, mystics and students of consciousness have been listening to physicists. ⁶  There are other related reasons which justify an emphasis on physics-mysticism parallelism, and the assumption that this will bring the problem and prospects of the thesis into the sharpest focus: (1) even in generalized versions of parallelism, science is often a synonym for physics, especially quantum and/or relativity theory; (2) recent developments in parallelism have centred around the physics-mysticism version; and (3) one of the most interesting developments in parallelism is the attempt to draw a connection between the ‘bootstrap’ hypothesis in high-energy physics and Eastern mysticism.

Ian Barbour has distinguished three basic ways of viewing the relations between science and religion. ⁷  One view is that science and religion are radically different.  The three basic orientations in this ‘contrasts’ perspective are (1) neo-orthodox theology, which emphasizes the uniqueness of revelation; (2) existentialism, which distinguishes science and religion in terms of the distinction between personal existence and impersonal objects; and (3) linguistic analysis, which emphasizes the functional differences between scientific and religious languages. ⁸  A second viewpoint is that the existence of God can be inferred from scientific discoveries.  This view has its historical roots in the harmony between science and religion expressed in the works of the seventeenth-century ‘virtuosi’, including Robert Boyle and Isaac Newton.  Modern representatives of this ‘natural theology’ include Arthur Compton and Arthur Eddington. ⁹  The third viewpoint identified

by Barbour and championed by liberal theologians and process philosophers emphasizes general methodological parallels between science and religion.  Liberal theologians, for example, claim that science and religion in general are characterized by empiricism, rationalism, and the critical interpretation of human experience.  They also claim that science and religion are both characterized by presuppositions and moral commitments. ¹⁰  It is interesting to note that the elements of Whitehead’s process philosophy appear in the later arguments for physics-mysticism parallelism, particularly in the bootstrap-Buddhism thesis which I will discuss in some detail.  These elements include the view of the world as a process in becoming, reality as a set of interconnected events, a relational conception of things, organicism (as opposed to mechanicism), and the self-creation of events. ¹¹

There are other versions of parallelism which vary in generality and strength.  R.G.H. Siu’s discussion of ‘the tao of science,’ for example, is a relatively weak version of parallelism in which science and Taoism are considered ‘supplementary’. ¹²  Stronger versions of parallelism emphasize complementarity, or convergence.  Parallelist claims can also be classified by the extent to which they refer to science and/or religion.  Townes, for example, compares science and religion; Siu relates Taoism to science; Capra compares bootstrap physics with Mahayana Buddhism; and LeShan compares the world views of physicists and mystics.  The following outline of physics-mysticism parallelism draws primarily on Capra’s The Tao of Physics (1975).

wisdom, thought, philosophy, and religion) because of its centrality as a cultural force in contrast to the cultural marginality of mysticism in the West. ¹³

The evidence for these parallels consists of statements from primary and secondary sources on how Hindus, Buddhists, Taoists, and physicists ‘see’ reality.¹⁴  Capra admits that such statements cannot serve as rigorous demonstrations for his thesis.  He relies on them, however, to stimulate an appreciation of parallelism as a subjective experience.  This is Capra’s objective in juxtaposing statements on physics and mysticism and drawing attention to common images of reality.  Two illustrative examples are: (1) the metaphor of the cosmic dance, and (2) statements on the physical vacuum, and ch’i.

complicated than the patterns observed in the bubble chamber because certain particles which are exchanged in particle interactions - so-called ‘virtual particles’ - are not observed.  Thus, the Feynman (network) diagrams that schematically represent particle interactions are more complex than the patterns observed in the laboratory because they take virtual particles into account.  Capra quotes from physicist Kenneth Ford’s comments on such a diagram: ‘Every proton occasionally goes through exactly this dance of creation and destruction’. ¹⁵  Such dance imagery, Capra points out, is not uncommon in modern physics; ‘energy dance’ for example, is another term used to describe particle interactions.  Dance imagery is also important in mysticism.  Capra refers in particular to one of the most impressive examples of dance imagery from the perspective of parallelism, The Dance of Shiva. Shiva is the multi-armed Hindu god whose dance of creation and destruction is captured in a wide variety of bronze sculptures dating from the tenth century.  The Dance of Shiva conveys the Hindu conception of reality as a continuous process of creation and destruction.  According to Capra, this parallels the modern physicist’s conception of self-interacting particles emitting and absorbing virtual particles in an energy dance that is the foundation of physical reality. ¹⁶

The parallelist method of juxtaposed quotations is illustrated by the following statements on quantum field theory and ch’i; the first is by the physicist W. Thirring, the second by the eleventh century Chinese sage, Chang Tsai: ¹⁷

The bootstrap hypothesis, formulated by Geoffrey Chew, is that there are no fundamental entities (for example laws, particles, fields, principles, equations) in nature. ¹⁸  Capra considers this hypothesis to be the culmination of changes in our view of nature initiated by the introduction of the interrelational concepts of quantum theory, developed further in the relativistic explanation of quantum dynamics, and carried further still by the introduction of reaction probabilities in S-matrix theory. ¹⁹

The basic characteristics of the bootstrap model are: (1) a conception of nature as a self-consistent whole (that is, all of physics is conceived to follow from one requirement - namely, that its components be consistent with themselves and one another, thus eliminating, ideally, the need for arbitrary, in the sense of unexplained, parameters such as the fundamental constants); (2) an approximation that neglects electromagnetic, weak, and gravitational interactions and focuses on the strong interactions (the rationale for this approximation being related to the fact that the strong interactions are stronger by many orders of magnitude than the others: since the strongly interacting particles are known as hadrons, this approximation is called the ‘hadron bootstrap’); (3) hadrons are composites, hadrons are constituents of hadrons; and hadrons are a binding force between hadrons (based on the conception of a force between two particles as an exchange of other particles; in this case the exchanged particles are conceived to be hadrons); the name ‘bootstrap’ is derived from this picture of a set of hadrons which generates itself, that is, ‘pulls itself up by the bootstrap’; (4) the hadron dynamism is ‘circular and violently nonlinear,’ with no free parameters: it is self-determining (that is, it can be realized in one, and only one, way), and therefore the only possible set of hadrons is the set in nature; ²⁰ (5) hadronic properties follow uniquely from self-consistency (bootstrap), and do not have to be introduced as fundamental quantities (that is, as ‘basic building blocks of nature’); following Gell-Mann’s suggestion, this idea is referred to as ‘nuclear democracy,’ and is opposed to ‘aristocratic atomic physics’. ²¹

magnitude of the electron’s charge) as empirically determined and theoretically unexplained.  The value for the velocity of light, for example, is not explained in relativity theory.  Bootstrappers argue that, ideally, all so-called fundamental constants should be explained in terms of the self-consistency hypothesis. ²²

Capra argues that the fundamentalist view is rooted in the ways of Western science, which in turn reflects traditions that spring from the Greek heritage; the bootstrap model, by contrast, is more consistent with Eastern modes of thought.  In particular, Capra stresses the parallels between the bootstrap model and Mahayana Buddhism, which is later, more complex, and more other-worldly than Hinayana Buddhism.  Capra follows Buddhist scholars such as D.T. Suzuki and E. Conze in viewing Mahayana Buddhism, represented in the Avatamsaka Sutra, as the culmination of Buddhist thought, sentiment, and experience.  More specifically, Capra, following Suzuki and Chang, considers Mahayana Buddhism (especially in the Hwa-Yen school of China) to be the fullest elaboration and clearest expression of the Buddhist idea that all things and events are interrelated and part of a ‘unity’ or ‘totality’. ²³

From Capra’s parallelist perspective, the most important idea in the Avatamsaka Sutra, especially with respect to the bootstrap model, is ‘interpenetration’.  This idea is expressed in the 2,500 year old metaphor of ‘Indra’s net’.  Indra is a Hindu god who appears as a protector of Buddhism in many sutras.  His ‘heaven’ (or the cover over his ‘celestial palace’) is portrayed as a network of jewels arranged in such a way that looking at any one you can see all the others reflected in it.  This metaphor reminds us that ‘In every particle of dust, there are present Buddhas without number’.  This, according to Capra, is the same non-ordinary idea bootstrappers have of hadronic reality.  Following a review of the various formulations of the bootstrap idea, including the technical S-matrix formulation, Capra concludes that bootstrap can be ‘… summed up in the provocative phrase, “every particle consists of all other particles”.’ ²⁴

explicitly incorporating consciousness into physical theories, a speculation endorsed by Wigner. ²⁵  This entails the transformation of the bootstrap model into a vision transcending ordinary realms of thought and language, bringing science into the Mahayana world of the unthinkable, ‘acintya’.

The basic data for parallelism consist of common language (for example English) statements on the nature and implications of physics and mysticism, varying in technical content.  The methodology of parallelism is the comparative analysis of such statements.  Similar rhetoric, imagery, and metaphoric content in such statements constitute the evidence for parallelism.  The basic assumption in this approach is that if the rhetorical, imagery, and metaphoric content of statements on physics and mysticism is similar, the conceptual content must be similar, and the experience of reality must also be similar among physicists and mystics.  Earlier I cited Capra’s comparison of statements by Thirring and Chang Tsai.  Perhaps the most ambitious application of this method occurs in Needham’s studies on Chinese and modern science, characterized by the continuing discovery of Whiteheadian philosophy, dialectical thought, and anticipatory scientific attitudes, concepts, and methods in Chinese texts.  This requires searching for, selecting, and translating materials for comparative analysis. ²⁶  At least three difficulties accompany this requirement.  One is that representativeness must be achieved first in selecting a particular piece of literature, and then in selecting a particular word, sentence, or paragraph.  No rigorous sampling procedures have guided such selections, nor am I aware that any have been proposed with respect to the specific problem of parallelism.  In the case of ancient texts, such procedures are not readily applicable due to fragmentation and corruption, as well as to the uncertainties about what texts existed, and still exist undiscovered.  Independent judgments of representativeness based on textual (internalist) and contextual

A second and more serious pitfall arises in actually comparing statements.  Comparable common language statements have to be derived from the mathematical formalism and specialized language of physics, and from the meditative insights of mysticism.  In addition, the literature of and on mysticism will in some cases have to be translated from several common languages.  In the case of Buddhism, for example, original texts and major translations are written in Sanskrit, Pali, Tibetan, Japanese, Apabrahmsa, and Chinese.  This is further complicated by the problem of juxtaposing statements written at different times, sometimes centuries apart.  The problems with respect to Buddhism and other Eastern religio-philosophical traditions have been widely noted. ²⁷  As for physics, most contemporary physicists probably share Feynman’s despair of communicating the laws of nature to persons ignorant of mathematics. ²⁸  There may be some, though it is unlikely, who share the views expressed, I believe, by Rutherford, that if a theory is good you should be able to explain it to a barmaid!  Einstein falls, perhaps, between these extremes in terms of his interest in and capacity for translating the formalism of relativity into English sentences.  Under these conditions, it is perhaps reasonable to expect adequacy (if not perfection) in translation, but naive to assume that the comparability of translations can be taken for granted.  Some effort must be made to arrive at a sense of the validity of the assumed comparability of statements.  This would necessarily involve consideration of the relationship between culture and cognition. ²⁹  Parallelists have not addressed themselves to these questions.

in which ordinary words compromise the non-ordinary experiences of physicists and mystics need to be considered more carefully than they have been in advocating and evaluating parallelism.³⁰

The third pitfall in comparing statements is contamination.  Modern mystics are at least aware of references to the concepts of modern physics that have filtered into the language of our everyday world, especially those regarding space, time, and causality.  Some mystics are well-versed in the mathematical formalism of modern physics.  At the same time, modern physicists have come into contact - directly and indirectly - with the ideas of mysticism.  Gell-Mann, for example, uses the term ‘eightfold way,’ paralleling ‘eightfold way’ or ‘eightfold path’ in Buddhism, in his application of group theory to the study of elementary particles.  The parallel in this case is purely linguistic. ³¹

‘Levels of reality’ hypotheses are relevant to the issue of translation in parallelism.  There is a controversy among physicists concerning the extent to which the nature of a given level of physical reality, expressed in a level-appropriate language, can be coordinated with the nature of another level (or other levels) to give a more general theory of nature.  The idea of ‘level-appropriate languages’ makes translation problematic.  Indeed, some students of science (for example Feyerabend, and to a certain extent Kuhn) have suggested that ‘translatability’ is virtually impossible.  It may, however, as Graves suggests, make sense to assume that ontic levels are not completely independent, and that, therefore, cognitive levels are not completely independent. ³²  Any given level-appropriate language will contain certain general abstractions and idealizations rooted more in cognitive processes than in external realities.  In general, Graves argues, it makes sense to assume that there are commonalities across levels and that these are reflected in language.

Finally, parallelists and critics of parallelism will have to consider the functions of language.  The centrality of language -including the language of mathematics - as a medium of communication about reality is well established in science.  Language may be more or less abstract, more or less remote from the world of our senses, but it reflects reality and can be used to say significant things about the nature of reality.  Language may have a different function in mysticism.  Chang, for example, refers to the ‘fountainhead’ of Prajnaparamita teaching (the perfection of Wisdom, the paramount practice and virtue of the practitioner - Bodhisattva -of Mahayana Buddhism) as ‘direct seeing’, an intuitive experience ‘intrinsically beyond words and symbols’.  Yet words must be used to communicate the Bodhisattva’s experience to other humans.  This dilemma is manifested in the practice of making a statement and repudiating it immediately.  The result is a literature brimming with paradoxes and contradictions.  If these are interpreted in terms of the function of language in scientific discourse, the ‘Prajna truth’ and mysticism in general appear to be a string of absurdities.  If, on the other hand, language in mysticism is applied to transcending the limitations and inadequacies of ordinary experience, then the situation not only lacks absurdity, but appears incompatible with the assumption of translatability and comparability in parallelism.  In addition, Chang has drawn attention to the difficulties that have arisen when philosophers have insisted on treating Buddhist concepts such as ‘anatman’ (No-Self) as philosophical concepts rather than as meditational, or therapeutic devices.  Conze also stresses the subordination of philosophy to a soteriological imperative. ³³ Parallelists have not attended to such distinctions, and have therefore failed to show why functional linguistic differences are irrelevant to their comparative search for conceptual equivalencies.

mysticism obviously heightens the dangers of such pitfalls.  But experience in one or both or these realms does not eliminate the pitfalls.  The problem of translating experiences into words for oneself and for others remains. ³⁴  This is a rich problem-area for sociologists, but one which demands a rare combination of expertise in sociolinguistics, fluency in physics and mysticism, and experience in the physical and mystical realms.

One of the frequently cited parallels between modern physics and mysticism is the space-time parallel.  Capra, for example, argues that modern physics and Eastern mysticism reflect an awareness of the intimate interconnectedness and interpenetration of space and time.  The idea found in the Avatamsaka Sutra that there is no space without time and no time without space parallels the view expressed by Minkowski that space by itself and time by itself are ‘mere shadows’ .³⁵  On the surface, such parallels are hardly deniable.  Graves, however, reminds us that we are dealing with ‘supposed translational equivalents’.  The semantics and syntax of ‘space’ and ‘time’ in Plato or the Buddhist sutras on the one hand, and in Einstein, Minkowski, or Wheeler on the other, are radically different. ³⁶  In physics, the conceptual transformation of ‘space’ and ‘time’ has rested heavily on mathematization.  There is no reason to suppose that this process of conceptual evolution has ended in physics.  But there is no indication that the non-ordinary experience of space and time in mysticism is any different for the novitiate today than it was for the ancients.  Mysticism does not seem to hold the same inherent promise of a surprising new conception of space and time that physics does.

The mystic’s experience of space-time unity may arise from the suspension of ordinary ways of ‘attending’ to the world.  C.O. Evans has characterized ordinary symbolic consciousness as ‘attention deflection’ ³⁷

source of ‘meaning’.  Evans hypothesizes that mystical experiences indicate that it is possible to suspend attention deflection, and to attend to the world in a way he describes as ‘absorptive’ attention.  Absorptive attention is non-symbolic consciousness, consciousness that cannot be communicated in symbols.  The structure of consciousness (in what Polanyi refers to as ‘subsidiary awareness’ and ‘focal attention’) is dissolved when attention deflection is inhibited or suspended. ³⁸  Evans’ theory suggests that the unity of space and time experienced by mystics has nothing to do with relativistic notions, but is rather the result of absorptive attention.

Evans’ distinction between symbolic (attention deflection) consciousness, and non-symbolic (absorptive attention) consciousness seems to be the same as Chang’s distinction between ordinary ‘one-at-a-time’ or ‘shifting realms’ consciousness, and non-ordinary ‘simultaneous-arising’ consciousness. ³⁹  In ordinary experience, human beings attend to one realm of reality at a time, and shift from realm to realm as the need for new perspectives arises.  Water is a liquid, or H₂0, or the product of electronic movements - but never all of these at the same time.  The Mind of Buddhahood, by contrast, experiences all realms interpenetrating harmoniously in the truths of ‘simultaneous arising’ and ‘simultaneous non-obstruction.’  This experience, following Evans, may reflect a human ability to inhibit or suspend attention deflection.  This suggests that the mystical experience of space-time is the product of absorptive attention and not of the type of conceptual evolution which characterizes the physicist’s experience of space and time.  Mystics may indeed experience space-time as a four-dimensional continuum.  It is not clear, however, that their experience is conceptually equivalent to the continuum experienced by physicists in thinking about physical reality and rendering their mathematical formalism.

The very nature of the quantum theory thus forces us to regard the space-time coordination and the claim of causality, the union of which characterizes the classical theories, as complementary but exclusive features of the description symbolizing the idealization of observation and definition respectively. ⁴⁰

This idea has spawned a literature in which complementarity is applied to the relations between science and religion, between different religions, and between different aspects of religious traditions. ⁴¹  While some proponents of complementarity parallels have attempted to identify Bohr’s views carefully and unequivocally, they have generally been too intent on defending analogies to examine the pitfalls of their efforts.  They have little to say about (1) the fact that Bohr himself never defined ‘complementarity’ clearly and unequivocally; (2) Einstein’s despair of grasping the principle of complementarity in spite of ‘much effort’, and (3) the exchange between C.F. von Weizsacker and Bohr, following von Weizsacker’s conclusion in a comprehensive article on complementarity (written in celebration of Bohr’s 70th birthday) that he had misinterpreted the principle for twenty-five years; upon asking Bohr whether his revised interpretation was valid, he received a negative reply. ⁴²

In considering this particular problem in parallelism, it is useful to note Jammer’s distinction between the ‘complementarity interpretation’ in quantum physics, and the notion of ‘complementary pairs’ in the history of ideas.  Examples of the latter range from Zeno’s paradoxes, to the medieval idea, ‘duplex veritas,’ taught by the Averroists and discussed by Duns Scotus and Siger of Brabant.  Jammer points out that the ‘complementarity interpretation’ is distinguished from complementary thought in general by (1) the fact that it is rooted in empirical findings rather than ‘merely abstract speculation’; (2) the specificity of the idea in terms of the impossibility of reconciling causal analysis and a space-time description; and (3) the link between complementary descriptions and complementary experimental arrangements. ⁴³

Complementarity parallels have been drawn on to show that science and religion both deal in paradoxes.  Austin, for example, explored the possibility of adopting a complementarist approach to paradoxes in religion, such as the idea that the Christian God is both a rigorous judge and a merciful father.  He was criticized by physicist James Park who argued that there are no paradoxes in quantum mechanics, and that Austin’s use of complementarity as a device for dealing with paradoxes had nothing to do with physics. ⁴⁴  Nonetheless, the literature of modern physics is filled with references to paradoxes.  The term appears in the titles of philosophical as well as technical treatises on physics, in the text of numerous papers and chapters, and in ‘problems’ such as Schrodinger’s ‘cat paradox’ in quantum theory and the ‘clock paradox’ in relativity theory. ⁴⁵  It is easy to see, therefore, why Capra identifies paradoxes as one of the parallelisms linking physics and mysticism.  Granted that paradoxes appear in the literature of physics and mysticism, the question arises whether they have the same or different functions in the two fields.  The parallelist contention that they have the same functions in physics and mysticism is not readily justified.  Paradoxes in mysticism are generally part of the nature of things.  In physics, by contrast, they are subject to study with the expectation that they will be ‘resolved’ - that is, brought into the sphere of rational comprehension through the development of new levels of awareness associated with advances in mathematics and physical theory.  This orientation to paradoxes in physics is easily established.  D’Espagnat, for example, applauded the Copenhagen interpretation in quantum physics because it emphasized formulating questions in terms of conceptually possible experiments and had as one of its consequences the avoidance of ‘spurious paradoxes and ambiguities’. ⁴⁶  Bohr, noting that contemporary scientific theory characteristically had to be ‘sufficiently foolish’ to be justified, conceived scientific progress as a process of removing foolishness

and paradox from concepts.  Similarly, Einstein envisaged scientific progress as a process of running away from ‘miracles’. ⁴⁷

The parallelist approach to paradoxes encounters a further and complicating difficulty in the predilection of Hwa Yen Buddhists for ‘resolving’ Zen-type paradoxes.  Chang notes that Zen monks turn to Hwa Yen for spiritual guidance through the ‘bewildering’ Zen Path and sensible solutions to ‘abstruse’ Zen problems. ⁴⁸  Perhaps there is a case here for someone who wants to argue for a paradox parallelism in terms of an orientation to resolution.  In any case, there are pitfalls here which reflect the existence of different viewpoints on the nature and functions of paradoxes in physics and mysticism.

One of the core arguments for parallelism rests on the correlation between (1) the essential teachings of mysticism on oneness or unity, totality, and interpenetration, and (2) the ‘wholistic’ direction of modern physical theories, especially bootstrap physics and monistic geometrodynamics.  Capra considers the essence of the Eastern world view to be an awareness of unity in the things and events of everyday experience.  The parallel with physics is based on the view that quantum theory has (1) abolished the idea of separated entities; (2) introduced first the observer, then the participant, and most recently consciousness into the heart of physical description and explanation; and (3) stimulated the articulation of a wholistic view of mental and physical relations.  The bootstrap idea of ‘self-consistency,’ in Capra’s view, is not unlike the mystical idea of the unity and interrelation of all things, a parallel he discusses under the subject of ‘interpenetration’. ⁴⁹

Without Emptiness nothing can be established.⁵⁰

The basis for correlating these ideas in mysticism with the concepts of modern physics is based on references by Bohm and others to the requirement in quantum theory that the universe be treated as ‘a single, indivisible unit’. ⁵¹  One basic question this idea raises concerns whether we are dealing with an updated version of ‘wholism’ in physics, or with a new concept which transcends the cycles of ‘wholes and parts’ approaches in the history of ideas.  Max Jammer suggests that we are dealing with something new.  He notes that the relational conception of ‘state’ in quantum theory, as initially outlined by David Bohm, is unique because it renounces the classical analytical principle variously stated as ‘dissecto resolutivo’ (Galileo), and Descartes’ Second Rule of Investigation.  In general relativity theory, a comparable development has occurred with the emergence of an apparent need for a continuum ontology.  Graves views this as unique in the history of physical theory.  He echoes Bohm on quantum theory and Chew on bootstrap physics when he speculates that modern general relativity - or geometrodynamics -  may require that the universe always be treated as a whole.  This would be the case if it turns out that no arbitrarily specificiable boundary conditions can be established for general relativity theory.  Intuitively, at least, this seems to be akin to the self-consistency requirement in bootstrap physics.⁵²

universe that is ‘really real’.  Graves is not a proponent of a static Parmenidian monism, but one which is internally differentiated to a high degree.  It is in this sense different from Spinoza’s ‘God-Substance,’ and lacks the teleological aspect of Hegelian systems. ⁵³

The general relativity theorist says that the geometrodynamic curvatures extend throughout space-time, and thus each body or source can be conceived to be everywhere at the same time; the Hwa Yen Buddhist conceives the universe in terms of ‘realm-embracing-realm,’ and the ‘all-in-one and the one-in-all’.  The general relativity theorist views boundary conditions as arising from the content of space-time, giving us one self-contained process; the Hwa Yen Buddhist enters Samadhi - the dynamic state of Enlightenment - and is liberated from all ‘obstructions’ or ‘boundaries’. ⁵⁴  The gist of all this from the physical side is a conviction among physicists that they are being pressed toward new ways of thinking about, in Feinberg’s terms, systems of ‘many intercorinected components’. ⁵⁵  Parallelists see this as a movement in the direction of mystical conceptions of reality.

The fundamental pitfall encountered in this instance of parallelism can be considered ‘thematic’, in Holton’s sense.  Holton conceives themata as ‘… fundamental preconceptions of a stable and widely diffused kind that are not resolvable into or derivable from observation and analytic ratiocination’.  Thema are invariably associated with antithema.  Science is conceived to be a dialectic process which, temporary victories for one themata or another notwithstanding, opposes thema and antithema and ‘energizes’ research. ⁵⁶  ‘Wholes’ and ‘parts’ can be conceived as thema and antithema (or vice versa), each rising and falling with respect to the other as the history of ideas in general, and of science in particular, unfolds.  The thematic pitfall involves the problem of whether ‘wholism’ in modern physics is similar or otherwise analogous to ‘wholism’ in mysticism, and to ‘wholism’ in pre-modern physics.  Gale, for example, has argued that there are many similarities - or parallels - between Chew’s bootstrap ideas and Leibniz’s conception of monads. ⁵⁷  These are the same sorts of parallels Capra and other parallelists point out in comparing bootstrap with Buddhism, as well as with Leibnizian physics.  If we are guided by a Holtonian thematic perspective, we should not be surprised to find such parallels.  It remains to establish whether we are dealing simply with long-established themata, or whether we are dealing with new themes reflecting new orders of human thinking.

This pitfall is perhaps nothing more than the tendency to try to understand the present in terms of the past, the unknown in terms of the known, a tendency manifested in the ease with which we draw analogies within and across all systems of thought.  For the case at hand, one basic reason for questioning these analogies lies in the mathematical requirement of nonlinearity in bootstrap and geometrodynamics, a requirement whose uniqueness suggests that we are not dealing with just another cycle of ‘wholism’ in modern physics.  The conceptual significance of this is that with linearity, sources and effects are independent and can be added.  In the case of geometrodynamics this means that if we are given a total field, we can analyze it uniquely into parts, and assign each part a source.  In the non-linear situation, we could not expect to break up the field into a set of independent parts.  It would have to be treated as a whole. ⁵⁸

Bohm is the most explicit among ‘new physics’ advocates in suggesting that we are not dealing with a wholism cycle in quantum and relativity theory.  Thinking in terms of wholes and parts and the classical dynamic of analysis and synthesis is no longer valid in Bohm’s view of ‘holonomy,’ a process of theoretical insight in which ‘new wholes’ are continually emerging.  Bohm describes this distinction in terms of the analogical contrast between the lens and the hologram.  The lens brought object and image into sharp relief, and ‘strengthened man’s awareness of the various parts of the object and of the relationships between these parts’; it furthered classical analytic and synthetic thinking.  He argues that, by contrast, in contemporary physics ‘… an instrument tends to be relevant to a whole structure, in a way rather similar to what happens in a hologram’:⁵⁹

There are two views of change in the scientific outlook associated with parallelism.  The ‘conservative’ view is that science and mysticism are independent but complementary ways of knowing; they represent, respectively, rationality and intuition.  This viewpoint is reflected in many of the works on complementarity in science and religion referred to in earlier sections of this paper.  The ‘radical’ view is that there are three modes of knowing. Siu, for example, distinguishes rational, intuitive, and no-knowledge modes of knowing.  No-knowledge, according to Siu, is experienced beyond the limits of rational and intuitive modes of knowing.  The realm of no-knowledge is devoid of shape and time, and transcends events and qualities. ⁶⁰  It is this realm of the silent apprehension of the ‘undifferentiable whole’ that Capra seems to have in mind when he discusses mysticism, but which he equates with intuition.  A more dynamic version of the radical view of knowing is suggested by Ten Houten and Kaplan.  They view science and mysticism as dialectically interrelated complementarities.  This view is rooted in the idea that one hemisphere of the brain functions primarily in an appositional mode, and the other hemisphere in a primarily propositional mode. ⁶¹  Comprehensive consciousness and knowing, including rational, intuitive, and no-knowledge dimensions, may involve the dialectical interaction of the two hemisphere-specific modes, and may have its physiological basis in the corpus callosum that links the two halves of the brain. ⁶²  These ideas are speculative.  The ‘modes’ pitfall rests on the fact that we do not have a convincing theory of knowing.  Are there two modes of knowing, three modes, or more?  Are modes of knowing an artifact of analysis rather than a fact of consciousness?  If there are different modes of knowing, how are they interrelated?  What is the relationship between modes of knowing and the structure and function of the brain?  The Ten Houten and Kaplan theory of inquiry, based on studies of the hemispheric functions of the brain, general-

ly supports parallelism.  Their interpretation of so-called ‘split-brain’ research, however, must be scrutinized critically given the lack of a fully-developed and coherent theory of brain functions. ⁶³  A related issue is the extent to which modes of knowing are inextricably linked with particular relationships between human beings and their surroundings.  Needleman, for example, notes that the fact that some scientists meditate or practice yoga is neither an indication of harmony between physics and mysticism, nor a bridge to the ‘quiet attempt to observe the mind’ some people assume it to be.  This viewpoint is echoed fervently and eloquently by Roszak, who argues that alienation and cultural blight are rooted in the ‘objectified worldview of natural science’ - that is, the physics of Newton, Einstein, and Bohr, and the biology of Darwin, Crick, and Watson. ⁶⁴  This suggests that science can only progress through manipulation of the material environment, and that this is fundamentally opposed to and irreconcilable with the religio-mystical approach to ‘appreciating’ reality.  However, science may be moving in a direction that will force us to reassess the degree to which we rely on experimentation to determine the ‘truth value’ of hypotheses.  We may be approaching a time when it will not appear incredible to consider the possibility that ‘truth value’ can be determined by a state of consciousness independent of the direct physical manipulation of variables in experiments.  This notion has been adumbrated in contemporary writings on the philosophy of science such as Holton’s critique of experimenticism, and Hooker’s discussion of non-linguistic dimensions in inquiry.  Ravindra’s position on this question in exemplary:

… whatever we can study from the scientific point of view of manipulation and control - whether it is universe, man or divinity - has been produced, at least partly, according to our plans; it is something that can be compelled by us to yield answers to our questions.  It cannot be higher than us; for that which is higher - in nature no less than in man - can neither be coerced nor violated by us.  We can prepare ourselves for it and wait, actively making an effort of attention, observing without violence. ⁶⁵

in quiet appreciation while the physicist presses forward, transcending ordinary experiences and at the same time actively seeking to explain what he experiences.  Any consideration of possible convergences between physics and mysticism must deal with whether, how, and to what extent some version of realism links these two modes of knowing. ⁶⁶  Capra’s view that an ‘empiricism parallel’ links physics and mysticism can be considered in the light of this discussion.

Capra claims that physics and mysticism are both strongly observational.  This is not self-evident.  The mystic’s distinction between (1) seeking, looking, and watching, and (2) thinking, may be a semantic trap.  The meditative state might be better described as a state of non-ordinary thinking than as an observational state.  The centrality of mathematical thought in physics (consider Einstein’s work, or the role of group theory in elementary particle physics) could be pointed to in support of the argument that theory rather than experiment, or abstract reasoning rather than observation, is the essence of modern physics.  If there is any parallel here at all, it might more likely lie in the direction of abstract thought rather than empiricism.  It may be that what we are dealing with here is a manifestation of different ways of attending to things, an idea introduced earlier in the section on space-time parallelism.  If this is true, and altered states of consciousness are based on changes in how we attend to things, it may be possible to correlate states of consciousness with criteria for determining ‘truth value,’ and furthermore to show that these criteria are interrelated and interdependent.  This would help to resolve the question of the relationship between physics and mysticism in terms of modes of knowing and consciousness. ⁶⁷

modern physics is converging towards mysticism.  The anticipations thesis looks less and less reasonable the more deeply we examine the parallels.  It reflects weak analogies at best; and these analogies are possible only because there are certain basic and recurring themes in human thought. ⁶⁸  One explanation for the apparent convergence of modern physics and mysticism is that as physicists have probed deeper and deeper into nature, they have been forced to abandon more and more of the images and concepts of ordinary experience.  Mystics, however, have been probing non-ordinary reality for centuries.  If it is assumed that the non-ordinary reality open to mystic experience is in the same realm as the non-ordinary reality open to physicists, it should not be surprising to find that the verbal descriptions of reality by physicists and mystics exhibit correspondences.  It is conceivable that such correspondences are implied in Bohm’s speculation that thought processes are critically dependent on quantum-mechanical brain elements, and that they provide direct experience of quantum theory in the way that muscular forces provided direct experience for classical theory. ⁶⁹

An alternative explanation is that physics is passing through a stage in which the boundaries of experiences that we have learned to express in common languages are being penetrated, and these experiences are pressures for creating a new, relevant vocabulary.  This is occurring on the level of mathematical formalism and physical theory, and on the level of common language.  If attempts to describe physical reality sound like mysticism, it may be because there are certain general linguistic patterns that people turn to when they have to describe the indescribable.  If this is the case, it is unlikely that physicists will become mystics.  As their inquiries proceed, and their experiences become more ordinary for them and for the general public, the common language can be expected to change and the parallels with mysticism will disappear. ⁷⁰

Physicists, according to Capra, ‘have made a great step towards the world view of the Eastern mystics’. ⁷¹  The pitfalls I have discussed illustrate that this claim cannot be validated easily.  Even if Capra is, in some sense, correct, it is not intuitively obvious nor logically necessary that the next step (or steps) must be in this same direction.  We must also entertain the possibility that the ‘great step’ was, from the point of view of the future of physics, a step in the wrong direction.

There is, finally, the pitfall of ideology.  Capra, for example, refers to the ‘marked anti-scientific attitude’ of people who are attracted to Eastern mysticism.  One of his objectives in The Tao of Physics is to improve the image of science by showing the essential harmony between modern physics and Eastern mysticism.  There is no need for seekers of wisdom and spirituality, Capra argues, to abandon physics; it too can be a ‘path with a heart’ leading to self-realization and spiritual knowledge. ⁷²  Parallelism can, therefore, function as a defensive justification for and explanation of the scientific approach, and a device for improving and supporting the image of science and scientists.  Similarly, advocates of religious ‘truth’ have responded to the threat posed by the successes of scientific ‘truth’ by seizing on alleged parallels between religion and science to justify and explain their ways of thinking and behaving.  This is illustrated in the literature on complementarity in science and religion reviewed earlier in this paper.  I will treat this problem more fully in the sequel to this paper.

Parallelism may be a direct or indirect manifestation of the emergence of a relational way of viewing reality.  Relationalism may be either (1) a manifestation of some fundamental themata (in the Holtonian sense), perhaps ‘wholism,’ that has been at times central and at times peripheral in the history of ideas, or (2) a new themata, as suggested in my earlier discussion of non-linearity and Bohm’s notion of ‘holonomy’.  In addition to parallelism, relationalism appears in (1) geometrodynamic monism, (2) bootstrap interpenetration, (3) Helier Robinson’s metaphysics, and (4) L.L. Whyte’s universalistic world view. ⁷³  Parallelism, geometrodynamic monism, bootstrap interpenetration have been discussed at length in this paper.  I want to add a brief note on relational metaphysics and the relational world view.

Helier Robinson has proposed a relational metaphysics which, he argues, reflects and is consistent with contemporary physical science.  His system turns out to be a bootstrap one.  The universe is conceived as a ‘singular possibility’; it is the best of all possible worlds in the sense (recall Chew) that it is the only world possible.  Reality is a ‘single polyadic relation’. ⁷⁴  Robinson does not refer to parallelism, nor does his work suggest ways of avoiding the pitfalls I have pointed out.  The fact, however, that he arrives at ideas consistent with parallelism and based on relationalism at least strengthens the imperative for critical studies of parallelism, and reinforces the notion of an emergent relational view of reality.